China’s New Ethnic Unity Law Deepens Concerns Over Tibetan Language and Cultural Rights
The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) expresses deep concern over the adoption of the “Ethnic Unity and Progress Law” and its far-reaching implications for the human rights of Tibetans. The law signals a significant escalation in the Chinese government’s efforts to formalise assimilationist policies in Tibet under the framework of the so-called “ethnic policy in the new era.”
Adopted during this year’s National People’s Congress and formally announced on 12 March, the law is scheduled to come into force on 1 July 2026, coinciding with the anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. Its passage represents the culmination of a policy trajectory that has steadily unfolded over the past decade. In 2014, President Xi Jinping introduced the concept of “forging a strong sense of the Chinese national community” (中华民族共同体意识), which has since been elevated as the guiding principle of China’s ethnic governance. This concept was formally incorporated into the Party Constitution at the 19th National Congress in 2017 and has since been systematically promoted and enforced across all levels of governance.
Subsequent political developments have reinforced this assimilationist direction. In September 2019, the Chinese government convened a national “Ethnic Unity and Progress Commendation Conference” to recognise individuals and institutions advancing state-defined ethnic unity. At successive high-level meetings, including the National Ethnic Affairs Conference, the Seventh Tibet Work Forum, and the Central Ethnic Work Conference in August 2021, Xi Jinping reiterated that strengthening identification with a singular Chinese national identity constitutes the core task of ethnic policy. At the 2021 conference, Xi explicitly acknowledged the state’s shift toward what has been described as the “Second Generation Ethnic Policy” (融合), a framework that emphasises integration and “intermingling” while steadily dismantling the already limited framework of regional ethnic autonomy.
The new law, comprising seven chapters and 63 articles, gives binding legal force to these policy priorities. It establishes a comprehensive framework that promotes linguistic, cultural, and ideological assimilation under the guise of unity. Of particular concern is Article 15, which mandates the promotion of the “national common language” and prohibits any organisation or individual from obstructing its dissemination. In practice, this provision risks criminalising efforts by Tibetan communities to preserve and promote their own language.
For Tibetans, this provision directly threatens grassroots language preservation initiatives, including informal campaigns encouraging the use of Tibetan in daily life, cultural practices, and community gatherings. Under the new law, such efforts could be construed as violations, effectively penalising Tibetans for exercising their linguistic rights. Similar implications extend to other minority groups, including Mongolian and Uyghur communities.
The law further mandates the prioritisation of Mandarin Chinese (Putonghua) throughout the education system, requiring students to achieve proficiency in the national language during compulsory education. This provision formalises a decades-long erosion of Tibetan-medium education. In earlier decades, Tibetan was widely used as the primary language of instruction for core subjects in Tibetan schools, with Mandarin introduced at later stages. However, since the 1990s, and more intensively in recent years, these protections have been progressively dismantled and replaced by policies promoting linguistic standardisation and assimilation.
The expansion of the state-run boarding school system in Tibetan areas has accelerated this process. Tibetan children are increasingly required to live and study in residential schools, often far from their families, where Mandarin is the dominant language of instruction and daily communication. This system significantly disrupts the intergenerational transmission of Tibetan language, culture, and religious values, raising serious concerns about cultural survival.
Beyond language and education, the law mandates the integration of state ideology across all aspects of social life. It requires authorities to promote “traditional Chinese culture,” “red culture,” and socialist values through education systems, media, and public institutions. Curricula at all levels must incorporate patriotism, collectivism, and narratives aligned with Communist Party history and national development. Textbooks are subject to centralised control, while media outlets are tasked with disseminating content that reinforces state-defined identity. Even family education is expected to align with these objectives, promoting loyalty to the Party and discouraging alternative perspectives.
The law also promotes increased “interaction, exchange, and intermingling” among ethnic groups, a policy direction widely understood as facilitating assimilation into the dominant Han Chinese culture. Measures such as labour transfers, relocation policies, and social integration initiatives risk further diluting distinct ethnic identities and weakening community cohesion.
Religious freedom in Tibetan areas is also likely to be further restricted under the law. It calls for aligning religious institutions with socialist principles and promoting national unity within religious practice. Monastic institutions, which have historically played a central role in preserving Tibetan culture and identity, are increasingly subjected to political control, including mandatory patriotic education and the prioritisation of Mandarin language instruction.
These developments take place within a broader context of repression targeting Tibetan cultural and linguistic rights. In recent years, non-governmental initiatives aimed at preserving Tibetan language and culture have been systematically curtailed. Individuals advocating for linguistic and cultural rights have faced arbitrary detention, ill-treatment, and imprisonment. Private educational institutions have been closed, and monastic centres have been required to conform to state-imposed curricula.
The recent case of Tibetan monk Palden Yeshi illustrates the human impact of these policies. After nearly five years of enforced disappearance, the news surfaced that he had been sentenced to six years’ imprisonment for organising voluntary classes during school holidays to teach Tibetan language to local children. His case underscores the increasing criminalisation of efforts to sustain Tibetan linguistic and cultural heritage.
The “Ethnic Unity and Progress Law” represents the culmination of a long-standing process of weakening the framework of regional ethnic autonomy. Legal protections nominally guaranteed under the Regional National Autonomy Law and the Chinese Constitution have been progressively undermined, particularly since amendments in 2001 that prioritised Mandarin in minority education systems. The new law consolidates these changes into a binding legal structure that advances assimilation as a central objective of state policy.
“The Chinese legal system must adopt a human rights-based approach and ensure its strict implementation across all legal and policy-making processes to guarantee the full realisation of fundamental rights in Tibet. This includes the protection of the rights to education, language, religion, and culture, in accordance with both domestic legal guarantees and international human rights standards,” said Dawa Tashi, Tibetan researcher at the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy.
TCHRD calls on the Chinese authorities to immediately repeal or fundamentally revise the “Ethnic Unity and Progress Law,” along with all related policies and practices that undermine Tibetan language and cultural identity. The law constitutes a direct assault on the survival of Tibet’s distinct cultural heritage and represents a serious violation of Tibetans’ rights to maintain their identity, practice their culture, and exercise meaningful autonomy.
